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ABSTRACT: Six years ago, the World Bank Group (WBG) embraced a new 
philosophy for its involvement in mining activities. After decades of promotion 
of highly liberalised mining codes, the Group repositioned poverty reduction 
and environmental sustainability as the fundamental objectives of its 
involvement in the sector. Within this new approach, local participation 
occupies centre stage, whereby a loosely defined mix of local associations, as 
well as residents of local communities affected by mining activities, are to have 
a voice in every stage of a given mining project. Building on the case of Lao 
PDR, this paper investigates both the participatory model promoted by the 
WBG, and the political underpinning of its implementation process. The 
analysis of the socio-environmental model promoted by the Bank suggests that 
the involvement of local communities is ensconced within a framework which 
conceives participatory schemes as a management tool to circumscribe the 
risks faced by mining investors on the one hand, and the enabling-state on the 
other. While successful in acknowledging the socio-environmental legacy of 
mining activities, the implementation process of such a model is proving to fall 
short of its promises. 
Introduction 
 
The abundance of Lao People’s Democratic Republic’s (hereafter ‘Laos’) 
natural resources has, in recent years, been the mantle upon which the 
government has stood to promise much needed employment, education, 
health care, clean water and infrastructure. Alongside the multiplication of 
dams being rapidly developed upon its rivers, the aspiring “battery of 
Southeast Asia” has also been resolutely eying its untapped mining sector. If 
for decades Laos was one of the poorest countries in the region, it now 
boasts steady economic growth and appears resolute to shed its “Least 
Developed Country” status by 2020. International donors, which were until 
recently the lifeline of the country, are cheering such fast pace developments 
vociferously. 
This paper investigates the particular role played by the World Bank 
Group (WBG) in contributing towards this fast pace mise en valeur in the 
form of fostering the country’s rapidly emerging large-scale mining sector. 
Of particular interest is the recent addition of a strong social-development 
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narrative attached to the multilateral guidelines. Within this new approach, 
local participation is supposed to occupy a centre stage, whereby a loosely 
defined mix of local associations, as well as residents of local communities 
affected by mining activities, are to have a voice in every stages of a given 
mining project. Echoing the Bank’s framework, Vientiane has quickly 
twinned pro-mining investment incentives with a pro-poor and 
environmentally sustainable narrative. In this paper, the dual provisions of 
the mining regime are viewed as a particular strategy employed by pro-
market interests to embrace the concept of “socio-political risk” within the 
industry. Based on the multilateral guidelines, the strategy is here defined as 
an attempt to both contain and manage opposition to mining activities, 
therefore reducing investment-risks in the sector. While successful in 
acknowledging the socio-environmental legacy of mining activities, the 
implementation process of such a model is proving to fall short of its 
promises. 
The paper is divided into five parts. In the first section, the 
overarching role of the WBG in fostering new mining regimes in the Global 
South is analysed in conjunction with the recent insistence on strong socio-
environmental provisions. This analysis will then be transposed to the 
particular case of Laos which, under the leadership of the Group, has 
recently begun to actively promote the expansion of large-scale mining 
activities. The third part of the paper is dedicated to the analysis of the 
provisions enshrined within the new mining law, and notably, its socio-
environmental safeguards. The fourth section deals with the actual 
implementation of the new policies, with the particular Bank-sponsored 
flagship projects scrutinised. In light of the alarming disparities between the 
narrative and the experiences on the ground, the final section of this paper 
investigates how the involvement of local communities translates into a 
renewed emphasis on socio-political risk management for capital and 
multilateral institutions rather than an opening of political spaces on the 
ground. 
 
Growing a socio-environmental conscience: the rise of the Social 
Development Model 
 
The overarching involvement of the World Bank in the liberalisation and 
deregulation of the mining sector is of course not limited to Laos.1 The 
Extractive Industries Review (EIR), which was established in 2001 to 
independently evaluate the WBG’s involvement in extractive industries, 
estimated that under the leadership of the Bank, no less than one hundred 
countries reformed their laws, policies and institutions during the 1990s 
(EIR 2003b: 10). 
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In her extensive analysis of the World Bank’s influence over African 
mining regimes, Campbell (2004) catalogued three generations of mining 
codes, which essentially followed the Bank’s evolving guidelines over the 
better part of the last three decades. The first wave of reform, which was 
carried out under the umbrella of the structural adjustment programs in the 
1980s, saw a dramatic retreat of the state from the sector. Oblivious to the 
decline in the demand for mineral resources in the 1980s, the Bank’s re-
assessment of the sector led to a new wave in the liberalisation of mining 
regimes, which extended well into the 1990s. However, the turn of the 
century was not kind to the Bank’s historical involvement in large-scale 
projects. The highly publicised environmental damage and the 
multiplication of reported cases of human rights-abuses linked to Bank 
sponsored projects were a painful thorn in the institution’s image.2 While 
the Bank did acknowledge that a certain degree of regulation was necessary, 
notably in terms of environmental protection, it is only within the past 
decade that the ultimate need for the state to play a regulatory role was 
acknowledged and instantiated in a “third generation” of mining codes3
Today, mining is understood to be one of the most environmentally 
disruptive activities that can be undertaken by business (Bebbington et al. 
2008: 893) and the concept of the “resource curse” is widely acknowledged 
by all stakeholders in the industry.
 
(Campbell 2004). As further argued in this contribution, such a shift has 
been heavily coloured by the recent expansion of the concept of “risk” to the 
socio-environmental and political realms. 
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The multiplication of socio-environmental problems linked to 
extractive activities, not withstanding the ambiguous economic benefits of 
the industry, led to highly critical literature suggesting that the actual 
benefits of the mining industry may have been overstated. The underlying 
idea of the “resource curse” suggests that an abundance of natural resources 
creates political and economic distortions, thus increasing the likelihood 
that countries will experience negative development outcomes (Rosser, 
2006: 7), a reality that is now widely acknowledged by all stakeholders in 
the industry
 The EIR found that while extractive 
industries can yield benefits for countries, data suggests that developing 
countries with few natural resources grew two to three times faster than 
resource-rich countries from 1960 to 2000 (EIR 2003b: 12). However, the 
Review further observed that the majority of the 45 countries that did not 
manage to sustain economic growth during that time also experienced 
violent conflict and civil strife in the 1990s (2003b: 12). 
5. The WBG is no exception: “resource-rich countries are indeed 
more likely to have problems achieving important development goals”, 
states the Bank in a recent evaluation of its experience in the extractive 
sector (OEG 2005: 120). 
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It is in light of the extent of the social and environmental problems 
linked to the extractive industry that the then-President of the World Bank, 
James Wolfensohn, in 2001 ordered a two-year moratorium on the WBG’s 
mining investments and a review of its involvement in the industry. While 
the EIR, which emerged from this process, did conclude that there was still a 
role for the Group in the sector, it underlined that such a role should be 
strictly limited to one of contributing to sustainable development (EIR 
2003b: 4). 
In its official response to the EIR6
Today, the World Bank is the unchallenged global leader in both the 
design and the promotion of socio-environmental practices in the mining 
sector.
 (in 2004), the Bank declared: “Our 
future investments in extractive industries will be selective, with greater 
focus on the needs of poor people, and a stronger emphasis on good 
governance and on promoting environmentally and socially sustainable 
development” (World Bank 2004: iii). While the Bank acknowledged that 
extractive industries may “aggravate or cause serious environmental, health, 
and social problems, including conflict and war” (World Bank 2005: 1), it 
however remains adamant that such negative impacts are not inevitable. 
Subsequently, wanting to maintain a presence in the sector while attending 
to the recognised risks, the Bank substituted its conventional policy 
recommendation framework for one that promoted far stricter 
environmental and social standards. The ensuing birth of what is here 
referred to as the “Social-Development Model” (SDM) echoed throughout 
the mining industry and within regulatory regimes across the Global South 
and, as discussed further in the following section, to Lao PDR as well. 
7
 
 Such influential work appears to be viewed by the Bank as “neutral” 
advice that manages to bridge communities’ needs with not only corporate 
profit-driven behaviour, but with governments’ zeal for fast-paced 
development as well. In the words of the Bank: 
The impact of mines on local communities has been an area of growing 
concern and attention, and one that mining companies, NGOs and 
governments are grappling with. The World Bank has used its convening 
power and neutral position to bring together a number of different 
agencies to pursue discussion in this area, share experiences and enable 
diverse agencies to work more cooperatively together, with the view to 
resolving some of the problems affecting this area. The convening of 
conferences, meetings, analytical research and the dissemination of good 
practice are among the number of ways in which the Mining Department 
has been working to gain a better understanding of these issues, develop 
mechanisms for resolution and propagate good practice (Our emphasis, 
World Bank 2010d).  
 
In line with this self-assigned role, the World Bank has assumed leadership 
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over key socio-environmental mining research. It is illustrative to note that 
the Bank’s Mining Department website lists a wide range of key issues, 
notably: AIDs and Mining; Mine closure; Mining and Community; Mining and 
the Environment; Mining and Local development, Mining and Poverty 
Reduction, etc. Crucially, it should also be emphasised that the WBG has 
been pioneering various global guidelines and safeguards on mining related 
issues 8 , in addition to its own International Financial Corporation 
(IFC)/World Bank policy framework.9
As further discussed below, the SDM has been calling for all 
stakeholders to assume new roles and responsibilities in the task of merging 
neoliberal objectives with environmental and social safeguards. This has led 
to approaches to engage local stakeholders into participatory schemes, new 
“partnership” initiatives between stakeholders, as well as new monitoring 
responsibilities for the state, the industry and more remarkably, local 
communities. Of particular interest to this contribution is to investigate how 
the SDM has been implemented in Laos. 
 
 
The promises of a sector: mining in Laos PDR & the World Bank 
 
Laos’ dire social indicators have long positioned the land-locked country as 
one of Asia’s poorest countries. A decade ago, almost 40 per cent of this 
Least Developed Country’s population was still living in poverty10
 Today’s goal is bold: to become a middle-income country by 2020, as 
indicated in the Lao “National Socio-Economic Development Plan”. The 
World Bank estimates that Laos will require a steady average growth of 7.5 
per cent for this. (2010b: 10). Notably, the country appears to be well 
underway on this front, thanks to the rapid development of the mining and 
hydropower sectors, both of which have contributed 2.5 per cent of the 
annual 7 per cent growth witnessed by the country in the last three years 
(World Bank 2010b: 1). 
 and, as 
observed by a WBG Fact-Finding Mission, its social indicators were far 
closer to the average for Sub-Saharan Africa than those for the rest of Asia 
(Boland, Kunanayagam and Walker 2001: 4). However, short of the last 
decade, Laos has radically transformed its economy, resolutely turning to its 
impressive abundance of natural resources. Not withstanding its 
hydropower potential, Laos, somewhat strikingly, is one of Asia’s most 
resource-rich countries, with more than 570 mineral deposits identified so 
far. Crouched between Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam and more importantly, 
resource hungry China, the potential attached to the mise en valeur of such 
natural riches have led to the multiplication of social and economic 
promises. 
While mining activities were described in the early 1990s as 
“virtually negligible” (US Geological Survey 1994: 491), by the end of the 
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same decade, the sector was identified as “one of the most promising long-
term growth areas” (US Geological Survey 1999: 13.1). Contrary to many of 
its neighbour countries, which have a rich history of industrial mining, Laos’ 
ventures only truly began in 2003, making it one of Asia’s “final frontiers for 
miners” (CLC Asia 2009). The country’s industrial mining production value 
has multiplied close to hundred-fold observes a World Bank background 
report, from around US$ 8 million in 2002 to US$ 600-700 million in 2007 
and 2008 (Larsen 2010: 4). These numbers however are far than indicative 
of the sector’s potential as only 10 per cent of the nearly 200 proposed 
mining and hydro projects are on stream so far (World Bank, 2010b: 1). 
Since Laos remains highly dependent on external assistance – the 
country’s external debt totals 54.5 per cent of its GDP (ICMM 2011: 59) – the 
resource sectors (mining and power) have become a much-welcomed 
source of Government revenue. The International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM) notes that the country’s foreign debt is significant enough “to 
worry the̘World Bank and the IMF who believe that there is a high risk of 
debt distress” (ICMM 2011: 17). 
Together, the sectors account for 20 per cent of the government’s 
total fiscal revenues, as well as most of the country’s FDI inflows (about 80 
per cent in 2008) (World Bank 2010b: 1; World Bank 2010c: 7). However, it 
is the mining sector that now dominates the country’s exports, as indicated 
in Table 1. Together, the country’s two large-scale mines—the PBM Phu 
Kham copper-gold operation and the MMG Sepon gold and copper mine—
account for over 90 per cent of total national mining production (ICMM 
2011: 17). Crucially, the revenues flowing from royalties and taxes from 
mining projects alone now account for the government’s budget deficit 
sharp decline–from 7.58 per cent during 1995-2000 to 6.29 per cent during 
2000-2006 (Kyophilavong 2010: 75). 
 
Table 1 
Exports – Lao PDR 
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Source: 
World Bank 2010b: 11. 
 
Key to this contribution is the central role played by the World Bank Group 
in assisting the country in developing its bourgeoning resource sector. 
“Today”, observe Guttal and Shoemaker, “the World Bank is the most 
powerful policy institution in the Lao PDR” (2004: 1). It can certainly be 
argued that the Bank is the chief architect of Laos’ recent “resource-boom”. 
As stated by a World Bank official in the Vientiane office, the multilateral 
organisation has been busy assisting the government not only with its new 
mining law and its implementing regulations, but with its broader 
regulatory framework as well (interview Vientiane 2011). 
While it officially remains a socialist state, the country started 
opening itself to the market-oriented economy in the mid-1980s, notably 
with the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism in 1986. By the end 
of the 1990s, the Lao Government had liberalised the foreign investment 
law, allowing for 100 per cent foreign ownership of business ventures. For 
the US Geological Survey, by the end of the 1990s, the country’s foreign 
investment policies were “the most ‘investor-friendly’ in the region” (1997: 
1). It is amidst such shifts that the government started to turn its attention 
towards large-scale mining. The ensuing 1997 Mining Law11 triggered a 
substantial expansion of the sector. According to the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines, as of March 2010, there were 269 projects in the country, 186 of 
which were in foreign hands12
Despite a notable increase in mining investments, the industry 
 (Boungnaphalom 2010). Such presence of 
FDI, states the U.S. Geological Survey, is “largely owing to the Laotian 
Government’s aggressive efforts to promote mining investment and to 
strengthen its management and regulation of the mining sector under the 
framework of the Mining Law of 1997 and the Investment Law” (2008: 
16.1). 
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quickly started lobbying for a revision of the Mining Law.13
In December 2008, Laos adopted a new mining code
 In a World Bank 
commissioned report, the 1997 Mining Law is seen as positioning Laos at “a 
competitive disadvantage compared with its neighbours” (2006: 23). The 
report argues for a “timely review” of the country’s mining law and 
regulations, thus giving Laos the opportunity “to become the leader” in 
mining legislation reform (2006: 23-26). 
14 which was 
notably the product of the Bank’s Seventh Poverty Reduction Support 
Program (May 2011-February 2012). 15 The Program included the 
development of complementary regulations which promoted standards and 
detailed regulations for environmental protection (see World Bank, TA 
Project P122847). It is to be noted that much of the new law’s significance 
remains uncertain due to the fact that its implementation documents, were, 
as of June 2011, yet to be approved.16 However, perhaps tellingly, the thirst 
for legal clarity and enticing provisions for foreign investors is now the 
subject of a Bank Technical Assistance project.17
 
 Approved in January 2010, 
the project is to develop the country’s capacity in the mining and 
hydropower sectors, with US$2.31 million specifically allocated to the 
development of the mining sector alone. The Project is resolutely geared 
towards enticing FDI: 
Clear laws and regulations for the mining sector, along with internationally 
competitive taxation, are key to developing the sector. While the 
Government has made considerable progress in these areas, including 
adoption of a new Minerals Law in December 2008, the legislative and 
regulatory framework needs to be completed (World Bank, TA Project 
P109736). 
 
It should be noted that along the World Bank, the IFC – the Bank’s private 
sector arm – has also been providing technical assistance for the new 
mineral law, the drafting of the country’s Enterprise Law, and the 
preparation of the new unified investment law (World Bank 2008: 38). The 
Unified Law on Investment Promotion tackles investment risks by offering “a 
clear and predictable” regime and creating “a level playing field for domestic 
and foreign investors” (IFC 2012). The IFC also provided further financing 
the Lao Business Forum, which is, according to the Bank: “an effective 
mechanism for enabling the private sector to raise their concerns to [the 
Government of Laos]” (World Bank 2008: 38). The funding notably provided 
the Forum with a secretariat to support its operations and to revise the 
Mining Law. 
In the following section, the rise this socio-environmental narrative 
solidly enshrined within the Laotian new mining regime is investigated in 
relation to the overall model promoted by the WBG in the mining sectors of 
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its country clients. Particular attention will be given to the SDM’s emphasis 
on local community development and participation, which is to occupy a 
pivotal place within each step of the development of mining projects. 
 
By the book: community development & environmental protection in 
Laos 
 
Under the gaze of the World Bank, Laos’s new mining regime has been 
tightly knitted with a strong social development narrative. Here the very 
development of the mining sector is seen as having to take into account not 
only national economic interests but the need to protect the environment 
and ensure community development. Therefore Laos’ regulatory framework 
“incorporates many environmental and social safeguard policy measures 
consistent with international standards”, boasts a World Bank background 
report (Gibson and Rex 2010: 1). Support for such socio-environmental 
consciousness appears to be unanimous in Laos as the government and the 
mining companies themselves have all vowed to implement solid 
safeguards. 
 In addition to the provisions embedded in the new Mining Law, the 
country’s legal framework grounds social objectives within the broader 
pursuit of economic growth. The Law on the Promotion of Foreign Investment 
(2004) promotes foreign investments, which are expected to contribute to 
improve living conditions and the overall development of the country 
[Article 1]. It also boasts several provisions to ensure environmental 
protection and sustainable development [Articles 3, 13:7, 16:3]. Both the 
Environment Protection Law (1999) and Regulation on Environmental 
Protection and Management (2000) are grounded in the concepts of 
sustainable development and public involvement. The country’s regulatory 
framework further ensures that project affected people are compensated 
and assisted to improve or maintain livelihoods, incomes and living 
standards [Decree 192 and Regulation 2432 and supporting Guidelines for 
Compensation and Resettlement]. Decree 112 Regulation for Environmental 
Impact Assessment (2010) further requires assessments of impact, 
protection of affected people, including grievance procedures and 
information disclosure requirements.18
 Boungnaphalom, the country’s Director of the Environment and 
Mining Inspection Division (Department of Mines, Ministry of Energy and 
Mines) notes that today, investors have to comply with a framework that: 
assures a balance between mining and socio-economic development 
activities, as well as natural resource conservation and environmental 
protection; remedies any negative impacts that occur during mining and 
after mine closure; provides community development (2010).  
 
 It is to be noted that, in agreement with the SDM, local communities 
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occupy a centre-stage within the socio-environmental dimensions of Laos’ 
new regulatory mining regime. Local actors are indeed posited to be key 
beneficiaries of the booming sector, which is to bring employment and 
infrastructure (roads and electricity) to isolated regions, provide funds for 
the building of schools and hospitals, and have a long-lasting spillover effect 
by generating new business for agriculture, livestock farming, and retail 
trade (Kyophilvong 2010: 76). Ultimately, mining activities are to nurse 
“Community development”, which can be defined as: 
 
[…] the process of increasing the strength and effectiveness of 
communities, improving peoples’ quality of life, and enabling people to 
participate in decision making to achieve greater long-term control over 
their lives. Sustainable community development programs are those that 
contribute to the long-term strengthening of community viability (ESMAP, 
World Bank and ICMM 2005: 7). 
 
The Bank’s 2010 Technical Assistance project to the country directly 
addresses the need “to promote models for corporate social responsibility, 
and risk mitigation and community benefit-sharing approaches” (TA Project 
P109736). The country’s new Minerals Law requires investors to study and 
recommend a strategy for sharing of fiscal benefits related to the mine 
operation and that they contribute to Community Development Funds. 
These funds are to be designed and administered in close partnership 
between companies, government and communities. The latter are to be 
closely involved within each phase of a mining project. The basic principles 
of benefit sharing include: 
 
x Participatory planning, gaining public acceptance and community 
participation;  
x Recognising the importance of providing opportunities to improve 
livelihoods and living standards;  
x Recognising affected people as beneficiaries of the project;  
x Equitable revenue sharing;  
x Environmental protection and development; and  
x Sustainable community development. (Gibson and Rex 2010: 14) 
 
However enlightened the new socio-environmental framework appears on 
paper, the obvious problem of the implementation of the provisions 
embedded in the regulatory framework remains. This is taken up in the 
following sections. 
 
The World Bank Group at work 
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All branches of the WBG have repeatedly stated that it is in light of the 
particularly heightened risks that mining activities represent to local 
communities and the environment that they should be involved in such 
industry. The Bank affiliates state that they bring to the sector safeguard 
policies and guidelines that “improve projects beyond compliance” (OEG 
2005: 118). In relation to hydropower, mining, and forestry, the 2005 
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) pledges the World Bank’s assistance to 
increase resources and capacities to promote environmental conservation, 
involve local communities in natural resource management, and strengthen 
the application of social and environmental safeguards in development 
projects (IDA 2005: 24). 
While the SDM resonates throughout the country’s unfolding mining 
regime, how have the community development schemes fared on the 
ground? The question is not easily answered, for the regime is quite new 
and changing, and with large-scale mining operations in the country yet to 
celebrate their 15th birthday. A point of entry to test the discursive part from 
the SDM’s actual provisions on the ground is to analyse the two natural 
resources projects in which the WBG has been directly involved: Sepon and 
Nam Theun II (NT2). These projects are repeatedly cited as “best practice” 
cases, notably in terms of their strong participatory requirements and socio-
environmental safeguards. 
 Albeit taking place a decade ago, the experiences of the Sepon gold 
mine project remain timely as the WBG regards the IFC’s initial involvement 
in the development of the project as a case of best practice. The mine, which 
was originally owned by the Australian company Oxiana Resources19 (with a 
20 per cent interest from Rio Tinto), started gold production in January 
2003. While Oxiana later found its own financing, it had initially requested 
the IFC’s involvement in the project.20
While there is no doubt that IFC’s involvement contributed to the 
extensive socio-environmental impact assessments which took place in the 
initial phase of the project
 As it is the case for all IFC-sponsored 
projects, the Corporation’s involvement had a dual impact; an important 
emphasis on environmental and social assessments on the one hand, and an 
added value for the company’s reputation. The EIR notes: “The positive 
aspects of IFC participation were greater stakeholder participation, formal 
documentation of the consultation process, a widely-accepted assessment 
framework (i.e. WBG safeguard policies), expert advice and increased 
stakeholder confidence in Oxiana” (EIR 2003a: 30). The report further adds: 
“It is clear that IFC helped strengthen the acceptability of the company to the 
Laos government” (EIR 2003a: ix). 
21—important for a project classified as “Category 
A” by IFC (i.e. it is expected to have adverse impacts that may be sensitive, 
irreversible, and diverse)—the process was strongly criticised by NGOs (see 
EIR 2003a; World Rainforest Movement 2004). Aid Watch argued that the 
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overall process had been very limited, if not somewhat superficial, with “a 
serious number of anomalies and shortcomings” in the application of the 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (EIR 2003a: 31): “In many 
cases there has not been sufficient in-depth study and analysis, and 
mitigation planning often has been superficial, alluding to further studies 
and further elaboration of details later” (EIR 2003a: 31). The participatory 
process, which was advertised as resulting from the presence of IFC, 
appears to have been rather limited to an information process. “One 
limitation of the ESIA was the consultation process of Oxiana, which mainly 
consisted of providing information and not having discussions”, concludes 
the EIR (2003a: 31). 
Another key example of an existing disparity between the 
participatory narrative embedded within the SDM and the implementation 
on the ground is the case of NT2. While the hydroelectricity sector22 in itself 
extends beyond the purview of this paper, the project nonetheless warrants 
a few words, as it has involved the World Bank’s endorsement and has today 
become a best-practice flagship project.23
The 2005 Country Assistance Strategy lists the support for the 
implementation of NT2 as “an example of an area-based, sustainable natural 
resource development program that contributes to growth, social outcomes, 
capacity development, and stronger partnerships” (IDA 2005: ii). The Bank 
was involved in several ways: helping the Lao Government to appoint and 
finance a panel of experts to advise on the handling of social and 
environmental issues in the project, legal experts to negotiate financing 
arrangements, and requiring the project developer to carry out technical 
social, environmental, economic and resettlement studies that have been 
instrumental in project preparation (Guttal and Shoemaker 2004: 1). 
 NT2 is the country’s largest dam 
and largest foreign investments to date. 
Despite being repeatedly cited as a key example of best practices for 
the country, reports from international NGOs suggest that NT2 has had a 
significant negative socio-environmental impact on local communities. 
Lawrence concludes: 
 
Provisions of the [Concession Agreement] and of World Bank and [Asian 
Development Bank] policies, particularly regarding resettlement and 
information disclosure, have been violated. But despite numerous 
monitoring missions, the [Multilateral Development Banks] have not taken 
strong enough stances—including withholding loan and grant 
disbursements—to correct Nam Theun 2’s problems and minimize 
negative impacts on affected people (2008: 45). 
 
This closely resonates with the issue of mining as it underlines the obvious 
problem of the very implementation of the socio-environmental provisions 
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embedded in the regulatory framework, however enlightened they may look 
on paper. The case of NT2 was quite explicit, whereby the very presence of 
the WBG was to lead to the active participation of the local communities 
affected by the project. However, while the public consultation and 
disclosure process24
 
 is being celebrated by the Bank, critics have been vocal, 
stating that the project has actually failed to meet the World Bank’s own 
standards and that in regard to indigenous groups, “consent for the project 
is neither free, nor prior, nor informed” (Guttal and Shoemaker 2004: 3). 
The authors further note: 
As the public participation process unfolded, it soon became apparent that 
its overall goal was not to foster genuine participation of project affected 
communities as described in the [World Commission on Dams]’s final 
Report and Recommendations, but rather to ‘jump through the hoops’ of 
appearing to conduct public consultation in order for the World Bank to 
have sufficient political cover to proceed with the controversial decision to 
support the project (2004: 3). 
 
Beyond the experiences of the two specific projects discussed above, the key 
feasibility issue of meeting the solid socio-environmental requirements 
embedded within the overall Laotian’s new mining regime should be closely 
analysed. Two notable obstacles emerge, one linked to the fact that in Laos, 
the voice of local communities are bound to be influenced by the one-party 
regime and second, the actual capacity of the government to monitor, 
regulate and implement the socio-environmental dimensions of the new 
regime is more than questionable. 
The vibrancy of the Laos’ “civil society” remains firmly nestled within 
the arms of the one-party regime; with its official mass organisations such as 
the Lao Women’s Union, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Youth Union, the 
Lao Patriotic Front for Reconstruction, and the Lao Federation of Trade 
Unions (ADB 2011: 1). While technically forming an organisation or an 
association is legal 25 , the number of Laotian “non-governmental” 
organisations remains particularly small.26
A senior Bank official remains positive however, arguing that since 
“Laos society is a consensual oriented society”, it makes “political sense” for 
the government to be genuinely committed to socio-environmental issues, 
thus “the substantial institutional reforms that are aimed at trying to better 
the situation” (interview Vientiane 2011). In fact, the Government did 
initiate reforms to facilitate associational life with the implementation in 
 The fact that all media (print, 
radio and television) are firmly controlled by the state is further telling of 
the lack of political spaces available. Crucially, as observed by Guttal and 
Shoemaker, less than a decade ago, Laos simply had “no political, cultural, 
historical, or institutional structures” for a participatory process (2004: 3). 
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November 2009 of the Decree on Associations. However, no laws currently 
exist to carry out the constitutional provisions with respect to the 
establishment of national NGOs and therefore, there are currently no such 
organisations recognised by the Government (ADB 2011: 2). It should be 
noted that the government has gradually embraced and encouraged the 
work of international NGOs (INGOs) in the country. However, this openness 
to outsiders has remained conditional upon such organisations strictly 
refraining from political activities. As such, the number of organisations and 
associations genuinely independent and dedicated to human rights or 
advocacy is seriously limited, if not completely inexistent. Tellingly, the ADB 
observes that the government has recently questioned the activities of some 
INGOs, specifically their criticism of some large foreign investment and 
infrastructure development projects (2011: 2). 
In addition to a lack of political space, there are alarming signs in 
Laos which indicate that the capacity of the government to actually carry out 
the socio-environmental safeguards enshrined within its overall SDM-
influenced mining regime is seriously lacking. According to the Bank, Laos’ 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) does understand the need to tackle the 
environmental risks linked to mining and the importance of rehabilitating 
damaged areas (2006: 19). However, the multilateral institution also 
observes: “there are insufficient resources to implement preventative or 
remedial action” (World Bank 2006: 19). The same document reports that 
MEM management capacity has been inadequate given the demands on its 
services: “Good managers are having to deal with environmental issues on 
an ‘ad hoc’ basis” (2006: 19). The failure to adequately enforce 
environmental standards appears to echo concerns in relation to the 
requirements for meaningful social impact assessments (SIA) to take place. 
Notably, as early as 2001, this problem was highlighted by a WBG fact-
finding Mission: “specific work on SIA regulations and guidelines within the 
mining sector is at a very preliminary stage” (Boland et al. 2001: iii). 
The World Bank office in Vientiane observes that Laos is a low 
income country and, when compared to its Asian neighbours, still has little 
in the way of legal frameworks (interview Vientiane 2011). A recent World 
Bank background paper paints a broader picture of the country, whereby 
while the laws and regulations in Lao PDR encourage the protection and 
sustainable use of natural resources, “some gaps, especially in 
implementation and enforcement capacity, remain” (2010a: 2). The report 
identifies key deficiencies: 
 
x Despite the economic wealth generated by natural resource projects, 
sustainable financing for environmental protection is still inadequate. 
Foreign assistance has been the main source of financing for natural 
resource management so far; 
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x Overlapping mandates and a lack of coordination among the agencies 
involved in natural resource use and management and among the central, 
provincial, and district levels of government; 
x Financial, capacity, and human resources constraints in environmental 
management, planning, and the monitoring of the environmental and social 
impact assessments have become the binding constraints to implementing 
existing legislation, as well as to responding to emergency situations; 
x The legislation does not specify types of penalties for breaking the law; 
x The responsibility for mitigating damage at the local level is not clearly 
defined and not ̘included in the project design; 
x A lack of public access to information on environmental effects and on 
proposed and ongoing mitigation measures exacerbates the negative 
impact. (World Bank 2010a: 2-3) 
 
However, Aviva Imhof, the campaign director of the NGO International 
Rivers, disagrees that the World Bank truly was interested in prioritising 
capacity offering that “if you want to build capacity, start small!” (interview 
2011). Referring to the NT2 experience, which was the very first natural 
resource project involving the World Bank in the country, the activist 
observes that “they began with the biggest project: three provinces, 120,000 
people affected; far bigger than the Lao Government could handle” 
(interview 2011). Moreover, Imhof bluntly concludes “It’s not a government 
that lacks capacity, it’s a government that doesn’t care” (interview 2011). 
While the debate is still raging, a consensus does exist on all sides 
that the process of regulation catching up with the fast expanding natural 
resources sector is slow and that “there are still significant gaps in the 
application of the laws as they stand” (CLC Asia 2009). 
 
The politics of market building: risk management from the local level 
 
In this section, it is argued that the questions related to participation and 
community development should perhaps not be limited to the study of the 
quality of the methods adopted but rather what political objectives the focus 
on civil society elements itself accomplishes in the larger framework of risk 
management. In such light, the involvement of local communities in 
participatory mechanisms embedded in the SDM should by no means be 
defined as part of an opening of political spaces for the affected 
communities—or in the worlds of the Bank: as “enabling people to 
participate in decision making to achieve greater long-term control over 
their lives” (ESMAP, World Bank and ICMM 2005: 7). The approach, rather, 
serves to manage investment risk from the local level. Here, the SDM 
becomes both a discursive tool to bring credential to a given project, and a 
techno-managerial scheme to process any local disturbance. 
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A common misunderstanding about the overarching significance of 
the rise of the SDM is linked to the novelties that it actually brings forth. It 
should be noted that the new socio-environmental project remains firmly 
grounded in the market model. The argument is better understood when 
paralleled with the fact that the SDM is always promoted in complementarity 
with the relentless push for the expansion of large-scale mining markets. As 
such, there is a dual narrative whereby in the first instance, the World Bank 
is assisting governments in the liberalisation of their mining law and in 
reforming their tax regime to be more competitive and attractive for foreign 
investors, and it is only within this framework that the institution then 
juxtaposes the SDM. It is illustrative to note that backed by the IFC, the 
Sepon project from the start had managed to obtain generous subsidies 
from the government: for the first two years, Oxiana and Rio Tinto were to 
be exempt from corporate tax, and their employees exempt from income tax. 
For the subsequent two years, corporate taxes were to be paid but only at 
half the usual rate. Furthermore, there were no taxes or restraints on 
repatriation of money from the project and the government has waived 
duties on imported equipment. While the Lao government was to receive 2.5 
per cent of the value of the ore mined, this was to apply only after Oxiana 
had subtracted the costs of selling, transport, smelting, refining and other 
treatment costs (World Rainforest Movement 2004: 86). 
The SDM’s dual narrative echoes Emel and Huber’s (2008) take on 
risk within the neoliberal order. The argument here is that the discourse of 
“risky” capital investment, in which the World Bank’s mining reforms are 
embedded, has “allowed multinational capital to essentially set the 
distributional terms of mineral investment largely to their advantage in the 
form of ‘investment incentives’ (e.g. tax breaks) or ‘attractive terms’ (e.g. 
zero to very low royalties)” (Emel and Huber 2008: 1396). 
 While it remains firmly grounded in the market model, the SDM does 
venture a step further towards socio-political engineering as it signals the 
larger recognition that the market requires specific forms of change within 
the very fabric of society. Crucially, and as further argued in this paper, this 
transition serves two distinct yet complementary objectives: to ensure 
market efficiency and to secure its long-term sustainability on the ground. 
Theses approaches assign a strict depoliticised role to newly acknowledged 
actors such as in our case, NGOs and local communities. 
This SDM merges two distinct legitimacy dilemmas that the mining 
industry—and the overall neo-liberal agenda—was facing at the end of the 
1990s: one emerging from the illiberal actions of state officials in charge of 
regulating mining activities, and one from the political backlash resulting 
from the negative effects of such activities on local communities, as 
discussed earlier. 
In a way, local communities are now assigned a role as 
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“accountability provider” to counter the governance predicaments that have 
historically arisen from mining activities. In addition to the negative 
effects—social, economic, and environmental—of mining development on 
certain segments of society, the former model was being challenged due to 
the local capture of mining revenues by local officials. This is what Harrison 
(2006) refers to as “neo-liberal clientism”, a new political class that emerged 
out of the advance of markets. Institutions have been emphasised as the 
remedy to counteract such predatory behaviour by penetrating not only the 
political realms but the social realms as well. Under the new model, civil 
society—and to some extent, mining companies themselves—is seen as 
having a comparative advantage over the state, which is overwhelmingly 
perceived as a grouping of rent-seeking individuals. Here local organisations 
are viewed as representative of the plural interests of the community and 
consequently, they are perceived as naturally keen in monitoring 
corruption. In this respect, it is telling to note that Laos ranks 151 out of 180 
countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index 27
 In their study of the Laotian case, the International Council on Mining 
and Metals observes that the clear capacity constraints faced by local 
governments has sometimes forced the companies to step in: 
 of Transparency 
International (2009). Such empowerment of civil society elements over the 
state however, may prove to be awkward in a country with a one party-rule 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, with a government who, due to a 
serious lack of capacity, may distinctly fail to assume its monitoring 
functions. In other words, while local communities and civil elements 
appear to be empowered within a SDM inspired mining regime, the model 
might ultimately transfer responsibilities which use to belong to the state 
onto a stakeholder which clearly may lack the resources to fulfil its new role. 
 
When companies find themselves planning and providing investments that 
properly belong to the local governments, the long-term sustainability of 
the sectors may remain inadequately assessed and under-funded in 
broader government plans. Furthermore, once the companies demonstrate 
their willingness to help with local economic and social development, they 
risk becoming a de facto parallel local government. This is uncomfortable 
for the companies concerned and is often deeply resented by the local 
governments, who see their positions partly or wholly usurped (ICMM 
2011: 45). 
 
In addition to a pressing need to curb corruption at the local level, civil 
society elements have now been acknowledged to be key players in insuring 
the long-term stability of the sector, a key component for mitigating the risk 
of investors. It should be emphasised that mining in itself is considered to be 
a uniquely long-term high-risk enterprise for investors. In addition to the 
fact that the period between investments and returns is often significant, the 
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industry is considered to be the subject of heightened risks in light of the 
“obsolescing bargain” effect, whereby extractive industries become 
“hostages” of the host countries. This is characterised by the understanding 
that “once the companies have paid for multi-million-dollar Ƥ ǡ
they cannot lightly withdraw from the host country” (Bray 2003: 292). In 
such a particular context, the need for a long-term license to operate 
becomes pivotal. This also explains the consensus in the mining industry for 
the inclusion of social elements in their project. Such practices, observes an 
ESMAP, World Bank and ICMM report, are “Good for Business”: 
 
Improved social performance generally leads to better financial returns. 
[…] If communities benefit greatly from a mining operation, then they have 
a significant stake in seeing the mine operate successfully and will help to 
overcome obstacles that could adversely affect the mining operation 
(2005: 7). 
 
Amongst the key rewards for mining companies to nursing community 
development, as further observed by the report, are heightened reputational 
gains for the company, lower closure costs and liabilities, efficiency and 
productivity and local support services, an improved local workforce linked 
to education opportunities (ESMAP, World Bank and ICMM 2005: 7). “In 
other words”, continues the report, “community development is a reciprocal 
process. By helping communities to develop themselves in a sustainable 
manner, a mining company is simultaneously helping its own business to 
succeed” (2005: 7). 
However, beyond such motivations which animate corporate social 
responsibility28 schemes in general, it needs to be noted that the rise of the 
SDM translates into a need to manage popular resistance and the risks that 
they bring to long-term mining investments, rather than an expansion of 
local political spaces, as suggested by the model. Local actors are engaged 
only within the logic by which it is in a company’s own interest to ensure 
local stability. In this respect, as explained by Rodan (2006) in relation to 
the recent shift in neoliberalism, what distinguishes the new model is not 
only the acknowledgment that some degree of state intervention is 
necessary to redress market failures, but also that a host of governmental 
and non-governmental institutions are crucial to market efficiency and 
sustainability. In such light, the recent interest in social relations and 
participatory schemes in the mining context reflects a move by neoliberals 
to create a framework which ensures the sustainability of markets at the 
level of society. Socio-environmental concerns therefore remain framed in 
terms of “externalities”, rather than risks confronting local communities. In 
their analysis of the conceptualisation of the notion of risk in the mining 
sector, Emel and Huber make a compelling argument by questioning how 
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capital has come to redefine the very idea of risk within such techno-
managerial framework: 
 
Largely ignored in the financial risk lexicon are the environmental, 
economic, social and public health risks to the landowner, whether it be 
the host state or the local community. These latter risks—recognized as 
significant by local community members, indigenous groups, and non-
governmental organizations that resist mines—are viewed by investors, 
banks, and mining companies as engineering and social issues that can be 
mitigated (2008: 1398). 
 
Crucially, this is a process where socio-environmental principles are 
embraced only after being re-packaged within a depoliticised framework 
which serves to manage the risks facing investors above all else. MIGA, the 
insurance arm of the WBG, observes that:  
 
[…] well-designed environmental and social programs can help manage 
potential reputational risks for project sponsors, reduce social conflicts 
within communities, protect the environment and help reduce political 
risks. For these reasons, MIGA aims to help its clients take a responsible 
approach to the environmental and social aspects of their projects 
(emphasis added. MIGA 2009b: 1). 
 
In such light, the SDM allows for a contraction of local concerns within a 
depoliticised framework, one that suggests technical solutions to problems 
which used to be perceived as highly political. This echoes what Carroll 
(2010) coined as “political technologies” embedded within the larger 
context of a shift within neoliberalism29
 
: 
Specifically, these new technologies included participatory approaches and 
consultation exercises designed to circumvent or dissolve implementation 
impediments. The core concern underpinning much of this was not to have 
input from newly empowered citizens in shaping the development and 
deployment of particular programmes and projects […] Rather, the 
technologies were executed in a manner that sought to build 
constituencies for particular agendas and marginalise opposition, in 
tandem with technocratic efforts to avoid some of the problems attending 
past efforts–especially environmental and social problems associated with 
large-scale infrastructure projects (Carroll 2010: 9). 
 
This assessment of the political technologies inherent within neoliberalism 
is highly relevant to the WBG’s SDM and its diffusion down to mining 
regimes throughout the global south, where mining activities have 
historically been politically highly contentious. The political and the 
environmental legacies of the sector have indeed repeatedly polarised 
 20 
public opinions—perhaps not unsurprising given these countries’ rich and 
unique biodiversity—a reality far from captured by the latest incarnation of 
the mining regime supported by the World Bank in Laos. In such light, the 
framework is nestled within the larger expansion of neoliberalism whereby 
the latter seeks to mend its acknowledged flaws by tackling the realms of 
possible contestations to the advancement of markets wherever they might 
arise–whether at the heart of the government or within civil society. Here, 
the participatory agenda aims to rally coalitions of interests amenable to the 
project. 
The shift to the SDM reflects an emphasis on investment risks above 
all else. As such, the idea expressed within the SDM to strive for “a sensible 
balance among the risks, benefits, and distributional effects of natural 
resource exploitation” (emphasis added, World Bank 2010b: 7), takes 
another light. Here the “sensible balance” is better defined as dedicating the 
maximum of socio-environmental safeguards necessary to address 
investment risks. The problem with the SDM is the obstinate refusal of the 
World Bank, a public institution, to acknowledge the very political nature of 
dictating what levels of risk should be acceptable for communities; as after 
all, mining remains the most environmentally destructive activity that can 
be undertaken. 
On that note, there is a certain hypocrisy in simultaneously 
promoting strong socio-environmental standards as well as the active 
liberalisation of the sector to foreign investors and then suggesting that any 
failures in the model should be blamed on a lack of a government’s capacity. 
The World Bank’s Vientiane office argues: “We are not engaged in reviewing 
individual projects, we basically provide the government with the tools and 
they are supposed to then use these tools” (interview Vientiane 2011). The 
Bank officer further notes that while the Laotian government is keen on 
developing a solid framework, “there is a gap between what [it is] intending 
to implement and what is being implemented on the ground” (interview 
Vientiane 2011). 
It is to be emphasised that empowered through its new mining law, 
potential mining investors are now assailing Laos30
 
, despite the country’s 
moratorium on mineral exploration licenses instigated in 2009. Ironically, 
the scale of the current mining rush is now making the Bank voice great 
caution, warning that the government’s capacity has not yet coped with the 
challenges posed by such rapid expansion. A Bank officer further explains: 
the process through which [Laos exploits its natural resources] and the 
pace through which it is done is really beginning to have a big influence on 
the ultimate outcomes. Doing it so quickly, with limited capacity, may 
mean that the outcomes are not as good as [the Laotian government] 
would like them to be […] (interview Vientiane 2011). 
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Complementing this perspective, the Bank’s Lao PDR Development Report: 
Natural Resource Management for Sustainable Development conveys the 
institution’s uneasiness with the fast pace of the development of the sector 
and the country’s lack of capacity, notably for the implementation and 





Building on the case of Laos, this paper analysed the recent emphasis on 
socio-environmental safeguards promoted in the model by the WBG, and the 
political underpinning of its implementation process. In this paper, the 
overarching question concerning the magnitude of the influence of the 
World Bank, a public institution, has been raised, both in relation to the fact 
that in Laos’ civil society is tightly nestled within the arms of the one-party 
regime, and the reality that there is an overwhelming consensus that the 
government is currently unable to carry out and monitor its own mining 
regime. 
In light of these clear obstacles to the implementation of the socio-
environmental safeguards embedded in Laos’ mining regime, the analysis 
has suggested that the involvement of local communities is rooted within a 
framework which conceives participatory schemes as a management tool to 
circumscribe the risks faced by mining investors on the one hand, and the 
constitution of the enabling state on the other. As such, the SDM should not 
be read as a novel attempt to empower local stakeholders politically. Here 
participatory schemes and civil society engagement serve to mediate the 
negative impact of mining activities on the ground, while also offering a 
depoliticised path to vent local contestation. 
Ultimately, this may bring the debate to another level. Rodrik (1998) 
observed that “every politician knows the clamour for controls and 
restrictions overcome markets when markets produce outcomes that are 
not endowed with popular legitimacy” (cited in Ahrens 2004: 11). As such, 
and this may very well be the very essence of corporate social responsibility, 
the new model might have been created in order to allow for the pre-
emption and preclusion of tighter state-sponsored regulations and 
standards for international mining companies, notably from the government 
of their countries of origin.  
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1 Hereafter, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA) are referred to as “the World Bank” or “the Bank”. 
2 On the specific roles of the IFC and MIGA in the industry notably see Hatcher (2010).  
3 See Hatcher (2004) for an analysis of the Malian mining sector as an example of third-generation 
mining code implementation. 
4 The “resource curse” is a term applied to the tendency for an abundance of natural resources to 
create political and economic distortions which increases the likelihood that countries will 
experience negative development outcomes (Rosser 2006: 7). The EIR found that while extractive 
industries can yield benefits for countries, data suggests that developing countries with few natural 
resources grew two to three times faster than resource-rich countries from 1960 to 2000 (EIR, 
2003b: 12). 
5 See Auty (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995). For a thorough critical literature review on the 
subject see Rosser (2006). 
6 For a thorough analysis of the EIR and the World Bank response, see Campbell (2009). 
7 It is to be noted that this greater emphasis on the environmental and social consequences of 
mining activities is part of a greater shift within the Bank as a whole. While the specifics of the 
changes carried out within the Bank amidst the Wolfensohn presidency (1995-2005) are beyond 
the range of this contribution, it should be noted that the period marked an all-encompassing shift 
within the Bank’s narrative. From its austere emphasis on the blind pursuit of economic growth, 
which characterised the 1980s and the better part of the 1990s, the Bank in the last decade 
embraced a more “comprehensive” way of doing business. “Our dream is a world free of 
poverty”, Wolfensohn declared, and in so doing, he committed the institution, at least 
discursively, to addressing the social aspects of poverty and to forging closer partnerships with 
other actors in development, including those within civil society (on the topic, see Hatcher 2006).  
8 Such as the Resettlement and Indigenous Peoples; effective public consultation and disclosure 
(1998); HIV/AIDS’s guide for the Mining Sector (2004); Sustainability in Emerging Markets 
(2002), etc. 
9 World Bank OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment (1999); World Bank OP 4.12 Involuntary 
Resettlement (2002); World Bank OP 4.10 Indigenous Peoples (2005); World Bank OP 4.11 
Physical and Cultural Resources (2006); IFC Policy on Social and Environment Sustainability 
(2006); IFC Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability (2006); IFC 
Guidance Notes: Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability (2007); 
IFC Health, Safety and Environment Guidelines (General - 2007 & Mining - 2007). 
10 In 1998 (World Bank 2010b: 14) 
11 Law No 04/97/NA on Mining (12 April 1997). Implemented by Decree in 2002. 
12 There are now about 150 mining companies operating in Laos, including companies from China 
(56.5 per cent), Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, Korea, Canada, Germany, India, Japan, UK, Russia, 
etc. 
13 Of concern in the Laotian case was the failure to meet the “clarity” requirements expected from 
a “modern” regime. In addition to the confusion over the terms relating to the transfer of mining 
rights (Article 39) and the expiration of mining licences (Article 34), the provisions for taxation 
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and duties were seen as a cause for concern within the investor community. Furthermore, while in 
practice the country did permit 100 per cent FDI into a particular project, Article 21 allowed the 
state to compel foreign investors to accept state participation in their mining venture, which for 
the Bank “introduces a conflict of interest given that it is the government which regulates the 
sector”. (Thompson 2010: 8). Interestingly, the 1997 law would have been tightly modelled from 
the Vietnamese mining law (Anonymous interview, Vientiane August 2011). 
14 Law No 04/NA was made publically available only in late 2009. 
15 Approved May 2011 (ended in 2012), the project (P122847) committed 10 US$ millions. 
16 Although government officials indicated that they are “80 per cent of the way” to getting final 
approval. (quoted in CLC Asia 2011) 
17 Approved in January 2012, the “TA for Capacity Development in Hydropower and Mining 
Sector” (P109736) has a committed amount of 8 US$ millions. 
18 For further details, see Gibson and Rex (2010: 16). 
19 The Minerals and Metals Group (MMG) now own the Sepon Gold and Copper Mines. MMG was 
formed in June 2009 - when China Minmetals Non-ferrous Co., Ltd acquired key assets of OZ 
Minerals. It is to be further noted that OZ Minerals was itself formed in July 2008, when Oxiana 
merged with Zinifex Ltd. 
20 The IFC approved a US$30 million loan in February 2002. 
21 In addition to the 5 volume Environmental and Social Impact Analysis, 16 targeted studies 
were commissioned, a Public Consultation and Disclosure Plan; a Resettlement Action Plan; and 
a Community/Indigenous Peoples Development Plan were submitted) and meetings were 
conducted with the government, communities, and NGOs. (EIR, 2003a: 29) 
22 The fast-pace development of hydropower has positioned itself as a significant purveyor of 
government revenues, which are projected to eventually surpass the mining industry. 
23 The Boards of Directors of the World Bank ($270 million) and the ADB ($107 million) approved 
loans and guarantees for the project in 2005. 
24 There were after all over 200 consultations and workshops conducted for the people both in the 
preparatory work, and during the implementation process. 
25 As stated in Article 44 of the country’s 1991 Constitution (Revised in 2003).  
26 According to Kunze (2010), civil society in Laos is one of the most limited in the world. 
27 The Index is a measurement tool of perceptions of public sector corruption. 
28 The larger mining companies operating in Laos, such as Pan Australia and Lane Xang Minerals 
Limited, boast strong CSR policies. 
29 There is a rich literature on the subject. See Carroll (2010); Gamble (2006); Jayasuriya (2001); 
Robison (2006). 
30 See World Bank 2010b. 
